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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-1956 
___________ 
 
MICHAEL DARREN DARBY 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD J. GEIGER; 
MATTHEW M. BINGHAM 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-01513) 
District Judge:  Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 21, 2011 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN AND VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 17, 2011) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In October 1991, Michael Darren Darby pleaded guilty in New Jersey Superior 
Court to first-degree murder and first-degree robbery.  He was sentenced to life 
imprisonment plus 15 years.  Darby did not file a direct appeal.  In 2005 and 2009 Darby 
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filed petitions for post-conviction relief in New Jersey Superior Court.  Judge Richard J. 
Geiger denied relief on both occasions; Assistant Prosecutor Matthew Bingham 
represented the state in the latter proceeding.  In October 2008, Darby filed a petition for 
habeas corpus in the District Court, which was dismissed as untimely.  Darby did not 
appeal; instead, he filed a “Motion for Stay and Abeyance on Mixed Petition Pending 
Exhaustion on Rule 60(b) Motion Made in the Court Wherein Plea was entered.”  The 
District Court denied the motion as well as Darby’s request for a certificate of 
appealability and appointment of counsel.  Darby appealed, and we denied a certificate of 
appealability on May 16, 2011. 
 On March 22, 2009, Darby, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a 
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Judge Geiger and Assistant Prosecutor 
Bingham.  He alleged that the state court post-conviction relief proceedings violated his 
constitutional rights.  Pursuant to U.S.C. §§ 1915A & 1915(e)(2)(B), the District Court 
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and held that amendment would be 
futile.  Darby appeals.  He also presents a motion for “Appointment of Counsel, 
Alternatively a Protective Petition for Stay of Review Pending Outcome of a Prior Matter 
Before the Court.” 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the dismissal of his claims.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 
2000).  We review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion.  See Lum v. Bank 
of Am., 361 F. 3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2004).  Upon review, we conclude that this appeal 
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does not have an arguable basis in fact or law, and we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 
The District Court properly dismissed Darby’s complaint.  Darby asked the 
District Court to set aside his state-court convictions and “all . . . adverse collateral 
review judgments.”  To the extent that Darby sought to overturn in a § 1983 action his 
state court convictions, he may not do so.  He may obtain that relief in federal court only 
by way of a habeas petition.  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (“[W]e 
hold today that when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his 
physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to 
immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy 
is a writ of habeas corpus.”).  If he sought money damages as a consequence of his state 
convictions, the attempt is barred by the favorable termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 
512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).  Furthermore, to the extent, if any, that Darby sought to file 
an appeal in the District Court from decisions in his state court post-conviction relief 
proceedings, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine also bars his suit.  See Exxon Mobile Corp. v. 
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); Great Western Mining & Mineral 
Co. v. Rox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (setting forth a four-part 
test for when to apply the doctrine derived from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 
413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 
(1983)). 
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In his complaint, Darby also requested “the costs associated with the prosecution 
of this action.”  The District Court interpreted this as a request for damages, which, to the 
extent it was a request for damages, was properly denied.
1
  Judges are entitled to absolute 
immunity—thus, immune to civil suits for damages—even when they commit errors of 
law.  Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440, 444-45 (3d Cir. 2000).  Similarly, state 
prosecutors generally enjoy absolute immunity from suit.  Yarris v. County of Delaware, 
465 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976)).  
Although Darby argues to the contrary, a prosecutor’s absolute immunity continues into 
the post-conviction relief context, “where the prosecutor is personally involved . . . and 
continues his role as advocate,” id. at 137 (citing Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 
799 (6th Cir. 2003)), as in this case, based on Darby’s allegations. 
For these reasons, the District Court properly dismissed Darby’s complaint.  We 
conclude, further, that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Darby 
leave to amend on the basis of futility.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 
103, 112-13 (3d Cir. 2002).  For these reasons, we will dismiss this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  We also will deny his motion for appointment of counsel.   
Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993).  In Darby’s alternative to his request for 
appointment of counsel—a stay of review pending the outcome of a prior matter—he 
                                              
1
 In his “Argument in Support of Appeal,” filed with this Court, Darby states that he was 
only seeking costs and not a damages award.  As Darby was not the prevailing party in 
this action, he was not entitled to receive costs.  See P. Mastrippolito and Sons, Inc. v. 
Joseph, 692 F.2d 1384, 1388 (3d Cir. 1982). 
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apparently refers to a separate appeal, which we ruled on in May 2011.  We will therefore 
deny his request for a stay as moot.
2
 
                                              
2
 We also reject as unfounded Darby’s claims that the District Court judge was biased 
against him.  Insomuch as he bases his claim of bias on the fact that the District Court 
judge previously denied his habeas petition, we note that “it has long been regarded as 
normal and proper for a judge to sit . . . in successive trials involving the same 
defendant,” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994), and that “[w]e have 
repeatedly stated that a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate 
basis for recusal,” Securacomm Consulting v. Securacom, 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
